The Israeli Right’s Plan to Carve Up Gaza
This is an edited transcript of an episode of “The Ezra Klein Show.” You can listen to the conversation by following or subscribing to the show on the NYT App, Apple, Spotify, Amazon Music, YouTube, iHeartRadio or wherever you get your podcasts.We are a few weeks into the cease-fire between Israel and Hamas. It’s a deal that has already been troubled by violence. But so far, it is holding.If you’re listening to that deal being talked about in the U.S., you’re hearing it spoken about one way:Archived clip of Donald Trump: This long and difficult war has now ended. You know, some people say 3,000 years, some people say 500 years — whatever it is, it’s the granddaddy of them all.But when I read the Israeli press, I am hearing and seeing something very different.In America, the dominant position on the Israel-Palestine conflict is still a belief, a hope in the two-state solution. But in Israel, it’s just not. Israeli politics is well to the right of where America admits, or even realizes, it is.One of my intentions in the way we’ve covered this conflict since Oct. 7 is to avoid presenting either an Israeli or Palestinian politics that differs from the one that actually exists. So I wanted to talk to someone about this deal who represents more of the way the Israeli government sees it.Amit Segal is the chief political analyst for Channel 12 in Israel. He’s a political columnist there and the author of the newsletter It’s Noon in Israel — as well as the author of the book, recently published in English, “A Call at 4 a.m.: Thirteen Prime Ministers and the Crucial Decisions That Shaped Israeli Politics.” Segal is known to be quite close to the Netanyahu government, and I think he speaks with strong sources among both them and quite a bit of their opposition.Segal is well to my right. There are things I think you’ll hear him say that many people listening to this will not like. But in order to understand this conflict, you have to take seriously where the Israeli public actually is on it, and how the government that is in power in Israel and the coalition that might take power in Israel see it.Ezra Klein: Amit Segal, welcome to the show.Amit Segal: Hi, Ezra.I wanted to start with the state of the cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas.How do you understand what was agreed to?It was something quite minor. I’m quite skeptical about the chance of having the biggest peace in 3,000 years, or something like this.I think it was a cease-fire based on a prisoner swap deal. It’s not something small in terms of the hostages. And it was a huge question in the war, but it does not end the war between Israel and Hamas. It’s like pressing the pause button — when Israel still controls 53 percent of the Gaza Strip and Hamas is in 47 percent and there’s a pledge by President Trump to actually unroot Hamas one way or the other.Now Israel is quite skeptical about Hamas just deciding to demilitarize themselves — but let’s give peace a chance.How did Netanyahu sell it to his own coalition?He doesn’t mention the term “total victory” anymore. Instead he says: We got the hostages back, which is what 80 percent to 90 percent of the public wanted. And we actually stay in the Gaza Strip and don’t withdraw from Gaza as long as Hamas is not demilitarized and dismantled.It’s like saying there were three goals for the war: Releasing all the hostages — check. Dismantling Hamas as an army — check. Demilitarizing the Gaza Strip and removing Hamas from Gaza — this hasn’t happened yet.But unlike all the offers made by the Biden administration and by many Arab countries, the war does not end when Israel is out of Gaza and Hamas is still there. It’s where Israel is still in Gaza, and there is an agreement that Israel will be there as long as Hamas is not demilitarized.So Israel is still in half of Gaza, and we got all the hostages. And I think this is the most important thing: Hamas was not alone in this war — Qatar and Turkey supported it. The fact that Qatar, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan and even the Palestinian Authority are agreeing to a plan according to which Hamas is to be demilitarized means something.In American coverage of the deal, there has been a lot of focus on what gets called Phase 2, which is a demilitarized Hamas, the possibilities of international operations and a new Gaza.You wrote that there is a view that “Israel’s unstated goal is to avoid moving forward with the next, complicated, and mostly fantastical phase: Arab soldiers policing Hamas with the heavy price of I.D.F. withdrawals from the Gaza Strip, as well as a future, however unlikely, return of the Palestinian Authority to the area.”If Israel’s unstated goal is not to move forward to the form of settlement or peace envisioned in that deal — what is the goal?Everyone would wish that Hamas would be demilitarized by outsourcing. No one wants Israeli soldiers to die at the pace of two or five people a week in order to have a mission that can be done otherwise. It’s just the pessimism about the idea that Hamas would see, for instance, two Emirati battalions and all of a sudden hand over every Kalashnikov rifle.It’s about what I call in the Middle East “cautious pessimism.” The highest possible American sources I spoke to this week don’t think it’s feasible. What they do see is a future in which, five years from now, in the area controlled by Israel behind what we call the yellow line — there would be a new Rafah —The yellow line in Gaza.In Gaza — not the green line.The 53 percent —Exactly. It’s the Israeli controlled area. And in this area there would be a recovery. Rafah would be rebuilt as a city funded by the Emiratis with a deradicalized education system and under Israeli security supervision.What you said is that you now envision a two-state solution — but it is a two-state solution inside the Gaza Strip. What do you mean by that?Since I don’t believe in the idea that Hamas is something that took over Gaza against the will of 2 million innocent Palestinians, I don’t see any way in which Hamas can be fully unrooted from Gaza. As long as there are young males in Gaza between the ages of 17 to 35, and as many Kalashnikovs as one can see, there will be Hamas in Gaza. And therefore the only way to actually create something else is in the 53 percent that Israel controls militarily.If you build a new Rafah there — an Emirati funded, Saudi funded — I hope not Qatari funded — city, in which there are no weapons and there’s an efficient police force — no tunnels, no Kalashnikovs and no hatred — then you can see the future. This would be the moderate Gaza. And the other Gaza would be what lies in the ruins in Gaza City and the refugee camps in central Gaza.Putting aside a lot of questions about it, when I hear this vision, it seems extraordinarily hard to administer. Is there movement between the people in the two Gazas that you’re describing here?It’s not exactly the same, but just think about East Berlin and West Berlin.Before the war in 1961, you could actually move through. But if you want to go to the so-called Israeli side, or let’s call it the American Emirati side, you have to go without your weapon and without being part of Hamas.And you have to run security vetting on people somehow?Yes, exactly. And market forces would then actually determine the future of Gaza. Because where do you want to live? In the ruins of Gaza, where no one pays for recovery and rebuilding, etc.? Or in the new Gaza that’s heavily funded and more, not democratic, but more Western than the other? There is a future for Gaza.You also say in that quote I read that Israeli society does not want to go to the point where the Palestinian Authority is ruling in Gaza.After 32 years of having failed attempts to foster the Palestinian Authority as a partner for peace, I would say that about 90 percent of the Israeli public does not believe in the idea of the Palestinian Authority. Because as long as its education system poisons the minds of generation after generation of young Palestinians with antisemitism, hatred toward Jews and anti-Western sentiment, people don’t see any option of prosperity and peace and a new Middle East with this Palestinian Authority.By the way, Israel is not the only one to have a strong disbelief in this option. The Emiratis and the Saudis, too, don’t really believe in this. That’s why they want a reformed Palestinian Authority.But to be honest, I think a Palestinian Authority that does not educate its youngsters on hatred and does not pay for slay is not the Palestinian Authority. I don’t see it happening in this generation or two to come.I think it’s fair to say that most of the regional players — and at this point the United States — haven’t been confident in the Palestinian Authority.I was actually surprised to see in Trump’s plan an end state in which the Palestinian Authority was believed to be the final governing regime. But if neither you nor the Israelis believe in that, then is there any assumed future in which Palestinians can exercise self-determination? Or is this really forever under Israeli control?I think you can identify two streams within the Israeli right wing. One: Smotrich and Ben-Gvir do not believe in a Palestinian state — even if the Palestinians were to be Americans or Swedish. This is the part of the right-wing that said: We want annexation, settlements in the Gaza Strip and mass immigration. I don’t think that the vast majority of Israelis is there.The vast majority, or the lion’s share, of even the right-wing believe in Netanyahu’s perception that says: We actually have given three symbolic concessions to President Trump — a future for a reformed Palestinian Authority, a future participation of this reformed Palestinian Authority inside Gaza and, more important than this, the image in the future of a reformed and united West Bank and Gaza together.Now Israel has opposed this for many years under Netanyahu. What’s the difference?The difference now is that according to Netanyahu and Dermer — if it’s going to be reunited —Ron Dermer — his very close aide.Yes, exactly. The joke is that in Israel, Netanyahu is the closest person to Ron Dermer. (Laughs.)Anyway, now it’s not that the West Bank will take over Gaza, but rather that a reformed, demilitarized and deradicalized Gaza is going to take over Judea and Samaria. Because according to the Emirati plan, for instance, they intend to reform the education system not only in Gaza but in Ramallah, as well.I live 20 minutes from schools where children are taught, for instance, that you should kill as many Zionist pigs as possible. You can’t have peace with generation after generation taught on these principles.You described the cease-fire deal as giving a number of symbolic concessions to the Trump administration. They’re based on these benchmarks. Depending on how things play out, they could be more or less symbolic.Do you think the understanding of this deal is the same for the Trump administration and for the Netanyahu government? Do you think they’re aligned on what it will mean for the benchmarks to be met or not met? Or do you think that there is a possibility of divergence in one way or the other on the two sides?Usually in diplomacy, the debates happen behind closed doors, and in the news conference, you try to actually marginalize it. Here, it’s exactly the opposite.To sell the plan for the Arab world, Trump speaks mainly about ending the war rather than eliminating Hamas. But the main advantage of this plan, as President Trump has articulated at least five or six times since the cease-fire began, is that between the two goals of ending the war and eliminating Hamas — he prefers eliminating Hamas. That’s why he keeps saying: If Hamas does not demilitarize, Israel would crush it, as long as I give the word.That’s why I’m quite confident that the No. 1 strategic asset of this cease-fire plan is that Hamas can no longer rule Gaza. That, I believe, is here to stay. As long as Trump is president, I don’t see any option in which Hamas’s presence gains legitimacy.You’re putting a lot of weight on this conversation and your vision on the power a reconstructed education system could have in shaping how Palestinians see Israelis.I think that raises two questions. One is why you believe it’s the education system, rather than the lived experiences and checkpoints — that sort of thing. Obviously in Gaza, huge numbers of people have now lost relatives and friends, and have seen their homes destroyed.Perhaps it was a bad idea to massacre Jews.It was a bad idea to massacre Jews. We’re not disagreeing on that. And it was an immoral idea — not just a strategically bad idea.But it’s a lot of work for an education system to do. So that’s one thing.But also: How is this work done? I know you’re thinking of it being based on what’s been done in the U.A.E.What is being imagined here?It’s not just the education system and the pupils — it’s also the media.I’ll give an example: If you watch Al Jazeera, you’ll notice a sudden wind change. I suspect this is a Qatari gift for this “wedding” between Israel and President Trump — that Hamas would no longer have this media branch named Al Jazeera to fuel hatred all over the Middle East.So it’s the media, and it’s education. I would compare it not to the U.A.E. or Saudi Arabia but to Japan or Germany after World War II.However this is not the case. Why? Because there was only one Japanese state. The Middle East is still full of Arabic-speaking and Muslim countries that hate Israel. So even if you live in a reformed Gaza and are educated on Western values, you can still follow influencers on TikTok who hate Israel. That’s why I’m more cautious. But now that I’ve seen these reform efforts succeed in the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia, I’m more optimistic.Now, yes, the ruins in Gaza might be bad for living side by side in harmony with the Israelis — but it can also have the opposite effect.I’ll give you an example: I visited the biggest mall in Ramallah a few weeks ago. If I were to send you the pictures, you wouldn’t believe it’s Ramallah. You would say it’s either in Abu Dhabi or in Cincinnati. It’s better than every mall I saw in Israel. I walked there with my kipa, and no one told me anything.Ramallah was a city where 20 years ago, soldiers were getting lynched. Things change, and you can change them more rapidly — as long as you recognize the problem.Is there a pragmatic view within the second, nonmessianic stream of Israeli society that, in the long run, Gaza and the West Bank should have some form of self-determination under a Palestinian government? That the government should be Palestinian — even if it is not today’s P.A. or Hamas?Or is the view that either it will be under Israeli control — that we’ve moved back to occupation — or that it will be under some kind of Arab consortium? I’ve heard people talk about the Jordanians, or you’re talking about the U.A.E., and they’re a big player in this — that there is some other alternative?Fifty years from now or five years from now?Let’s say 10 years from now.Here’s the main debate between the Israeli median voter and the center left in the U.S. The center left in the U.S. says: We should try to give Palestinians a state because that’s how people are used to living.But Israelis say: We gave them a state — Gaza was a state. This was the outcome.When Israel unilaterally evacuated the settlements in 2005, it actually abandoned Gaza. Israelis were under the impression that if they built a big wall, they could forget about Gaza. The outcome was horrifying for Israelis.The Palestinian Authority was around 60 percent state, right? It failed in the Second Intifada, with 1,200 casualties over five years. And when we gave them a state in Gaza, we got 1,200 casualties in five hours.That’s why Israelis don’t even want to talk about it now. Actually, I feel it’s easier to speak about this 20 years from now. Because this is the time frame for raising a new generation. I would say that you’ll have 60 percent to 70 percent statehood with a reformed entity — I don’t want to call it the Palestinian Authority, but something similar to this — living side-by-side in peace with Israel.A Palestinian would say: None of these things were anywhere close to a state. They did not have control of their own borders. They could not leave and come at will.It will never be 100 percent —There was functionally a siege to control the borders and bar different goods from coming in, which is partially why you got the tunnels in Gaza.But in the West Bank, there are checkpoints. You have a tremendous amount of Israeli control over daily life. I’ve been through it. It is striking and visually apparent the moment you set foot in it.And they would say the reason for this ongoing conflict is that for the Palestinians, it is ongoing. And that in none of these 60 percent or 50 percent states that you’re describing was there anything like genuine self-determination or freedom. And in that condition, there will never be any kind of stability.I refuse to call it a cycle of violence because the idea is that we do something and then they take revenge and vice versa — and that’s not the case.There was a wide agreement in Israel toward a two-state solution. But what we have to conclude from the events of Oct. 7 is that the only reason it didn’t happen in the West Bank is that the I.D.F. is still there.I think we spoke about this in Jerusalem a year and a half ago: The level of support for the Oct. 7 massacre in the West Bank was even higher than in the Gaza Strip because they were not going to pay the price of bombings, etc. So we should be very cautious before we give anything.The last attempt at real peace — not a cold peace, but the kind of peace between Germany and France. That was the perception in the 1990s — this multicultural era following the fall of the Berlin Wall. The new Middle East. Peres and Rabin are in office. The center left is in control. Michael Jackson had a concert in Tel Aviv. That was the sentiment.I lived in a settlement. Even in this settlement, far from the eye, far on the right, we could feel the winds of change. And it collapsed here not because of the Israelis, but because they didn’t want peace.As long as we don’t take care of the idea that the Palestinian image is not of a state living side by side with Israel but of: From the river to the sea, Palestine shall be free. I believe it when they say it. I don’t think it’s just a slogan and campaign ad. As long as we don’t change it, we’re not going to see peace as we describe it.The Wall Street Journal reported on Wednesday that Arab governments strongly oppose the idea of dividing Gaza, arguing it could lead to a zone of permanent Israeli control inside the enclave.That seems more or less what we’re talking about — permanent Israeli control inside the enclave. But in that world, the Journal reported, they’re unlikely to commit troops to police the enclave on those terms.Do you think Israel is going to face a choice between the involvement that you and others are hoping for — from the U.A.E., Saudis and from others — and having the level of control, involvement, security and presence that you’re describing?To be honest, I don’t think any of the actors know what is going to happen.No one knew Berlin would be divided into two cities — not even two days before the wall was built. Like in Sherlock Holmes’s stories: Once you rule out every possible option that doesn’t make sense, the last one stands.I don’t see Hamas demilitarizing itself. I don’t think the I.D.F. would soon invade Gaza again with full engines and five divisions. And hence, I think the only option is what I’ve described. It’s not perfect — I’m just trying to envision what’s going to happen five years from now.I appreciate the realism you’re offering on that from the Israeli perspective.One reason I think that the two-state solution language caught my eye is that this feels more like the West Bank solution for Gaza.Exactly.Except in this case, the role of the P.A. is being played by the U.A.E. and some sort of Arab consortium.But that sets up this other set of dynamics that we’re seeing play out with incredible force and violence in the West Bank right now. Which is that there is a lot of pressure in Israeli society, particularly over time, for expansion, annexation and settlements to be returned to Gaza.This is not a situation where Israeli society wants Palestinians living in a thriving Israel and U.A.E.-controlled Gaza.I’m not sure. I come from the most ideological settlement in Judea and Samaria. Yet I allow myself to say that the vast majority of Israelis, when they speak about right-wing ideas, they’re not thinking about annexation or settlements in the Gaza Strip. Being a right-winger in Israel, or being hawkish, means that you think the only solution to protect Israelis is not by speeches by a U.S. president or international treaties — it’s through Israeli soldiers with boots on the ground where needed.This is why the collision between the leftist idea behind the Oslo Accord and the right-wing idea of annexation actually led to the outcome you have just described in Judea and Samaria in the West Bank: a permanent Israeli security presence in Palestinian areas — but no annexation. It’s not a coincidence.In my opinion, the same outcome will occur in Gaza — a heavy security presence.Another way to describe it — which you’ve used in other columns and interviews — is that the Israeli goal is “Lebanonization.”Exactly.What is Lebanonization?In the past, Lebanonization meant something really bad: Israeli military presence, suffering from booby traps or terrorist attacks and losing two to three soldiers a week or a month.Following the war, Lebanonization means something way more positive — that you have a cease-fire. But this cease-fire is actually enforced — with heavy fire when necessary. When Hezbollah tries to re-arm itself, Israel attacks.Since the cease-fire began almost a year ago, Israel has attacked more than a thousand times, and Hezbollah hasn’t dared to retaliate even once, because they have been deterred.I think this is what Israelis want from Gaza. When you have a big perimeter, the imminent threat no longer exists. And then you can attack from the air once you see a tunnel being built.When I was in Israel a year ago in June, I was talking to people who lived on the border with Lebanon. At that time, they were furious. They felt completely unsafe. They would say: I can see Hezbollah from my house.Since then, Israel has functionally destroyed Hezbollah. It is not gone as an entity, but the threat it poses has been significantly reduced.Israel’s most significant victory since the 1967 war.The reason I ask about it is because not very long ago, many Israelis seemed to feel that the Lebanonization strategy had been a failure —The first Lebanonization —So you mean the Lebanonization of the past year?The early period of Lebanonization meant that your enemy was just one inch from your border, with commando divisions, and you trusted the international border to be sacred.The new Lebanonization means having military outposts, and you attack when necessary. That’s what I meant.So when you talk about Lebanon as it actually exists, Gaza as it’s coming to exist and the West Bank as it currently exists, the theory of the Israeli mainstream — what you call the right but what seems to me to be the center — is: There is no security without actual constant boots on the ground presence and surveillance. There is no trusting an agreement. There is no pulling back. Either you are there, you can see it, and you have operational control, or you are not safe.And the lesson that Israeli society has taken from Oct. 7 — and also I suspect from attacks on Iran, Hezbollah and Syria — is that the one thing it can trust in is its own military strength.Exactly.It came exactly when President Trump talked about Greenland. I know he’s not going to invade Greenland, but his talking points about annexing Greenland or taking over the Panama Canal articulated something Israelis can understand. It’s not about imperialism, it’s about how international borders used to be sacred — but it’s no longer the case.And when you see Russia invade Ukraine — and multiply that by a thousand, because Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran are way more monstrous — you realize you can’t only trust international guarantees or borders. You have to be wherever there is danger. This is the main lesson from Oct. 7.Trump’s view of power, strength, geopolitics and treaties is very different from that of the Republicans and Democrats who preceded him. But I’d be interested to hear you reflect more on Trumpism — and the rise of right-wing populist parties in many other countries, particularly in Europe.How has that affected Israeli politics — its sense of what is possible and what is desirable?Following Super Tuesday in March 2016, when Trump took over the Republican Party, Netanyahu told his staff: Be like Trump.He repeated those three words, and then he shifted from the TV Netanyahu to the Facebook Netanyahu. Netanyahu, once the elder statesman — think someone like Ronald Reagan, but even more boring — George Bush. Someone like that. And he turned into Donald Trump.Now, he’s no Donald Trump — he’s way more educated, his English is better. (Laughs.) But he changed.And in my opinion, this is why, in an almost absurd way, the radical right wing in Israel — or the power of the populist right — is way smaller than in the U.S., the U.K., France and Germany. Why? Because Israel still has the founding father of the right, Benjamin Netanyahu — who is two at the price of one. He’s both the elder statesman who secures U.S. agreement to attack Iran, annex the Golan Heights and recognize Jerusalem. At the very same time, he’s the Netanyahu who speaks quite viciously about the left.So once Netanyahu resigns, you’ll see a spike in the representation of the far right in Israel.I don’t know how many people are aware of the fact that both Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, combined, got only 10 percent of the popular vote in Israel. Just compare that with the Reform Party in the U.K. these days.I think Trump’s most significant foreign policy success of his first term was the Abraham Accords.That’s based on Netanyahu, Kushner and others realizing — and this comes from some of the Gulf states, too — that there is a transactional relationship that is possible with surrounding Arab states absent any change in Israel’s relationship with the Palestinians.Exactly.Somewhat to the surprise of many, the Abraham Accords have held through this whole period.You recently wrote that Israel’s Minister of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer believes the chance of Israel signing peace agreements with Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and even Syria has now increased. There is a belief that with the cease-fire, they are on the cusp of an expansion of the Abraham Accords. Why?There has been a gigantic fight over the last two years, which is rarely spoken about.The main idea behind Oct. 7 and behind killing as many Jews as possible was to stop the normalization process and the Abraham Accords from happening. It was 12 days before Saudi Arabia was to sign a peace treaty with Israel. The due date was Oct. 19, 2023.The whole idea of the Abraham Accords was based on denying the liberal idea that Israel’s involvement with normalization in the Middle East had to go through Ramallah, the Palestinian capital.Many Arab countries refused to base their commercial relationship and relationship with the United States on the idea that a very old, unelected dictator named Abbas is going to actually set the terms of the entire regime.And that was the idea behind the peace agreement between Israel and the Emiratis. Which, in my opinion, is the most important development in Israel’s history except for only the Six-Day War, in 1967.And that’s why I, as a right-winger, wrote against annexation of the settlements a few weeks ago. What I heard from my friends in the U.A.E. is that this would be too much on their plate to digest. This is one thing.Now apart from the military operation, the best Israeli answer to Oct. 7 would be to expand the Abraham Accords, thus proving that strategically speaking — not even morally speaking — Oct. 7 was a failure.That’s why, in my opinion, Israel’s efforts should be based on expanding the peace agreements with Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Syria. And from what I hear, there is an option that the agreement with Syria would be more than merely a security agreement.What are these agreements now based on?For a very long time, the relationship between Israel and its neighbors was understood to be — “ideological” isn’t quite the right word — based on an assessment of the moral and ethical condition of Israel’s relationship with Palestinians. And there’s been a move toward these bilateral agreements that are much more transactional.In my opinion, the Emiratis signed that peace treaty with Israel because they no longer saw the Middle East as a battlefield of Jews versus Muslims but of radicals versus moderates. Or, if you want, a Shia versus Sunni and Jewish state.That was the main idea behind it.But even in these countries, there’s been a huge amount of anger over the devastation and the death toll in Gaza. So what are the chits being traded back and forth?There was a change following Oct. 7. Before then, all the Saudis wanted — I’ll put it undiplomatically — was lip service regarding the Palestinian question. Prior to Oct. 7, the Saudis wanted something quite vague — that even Smotrich and Ben-Gvir would greenlight it.Following Oct. 7, they nonetheless want a bit more. Now I don’t know what this “more” is. I suspect the idea of the Palestinian Authority somehow being involved, symbolically or hypothetically, in the Gaza Strip — part of the agreement was that Saudi Arabia would base normalization on that idea. So this would be the Palestinian ingredient of the normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel.But my mistake as a commentator was that prior to Oct. 7, I thought that Netanyahu’s main achievement was that he choked the idea of Palestinian statehood. I still think that there is not going to be a Palestinian state in our lifetime. But following Oct. 7, there is a presence to this idea.Israel has become such a capable developer of technology and weaponry — and highly technological weaponry, in particular — that it seems to have become — I don’t want to call it a soft power — a medium power that is at the base of many of these agreements. Both that Israel is part of your security umbrella, and it’s a way station to a closer relationship with America — particularly under Donald Trump.But even in Europe, where a tremendous amount of public opinion and state-level opinion has turned against Israel —Right.Israel, as a seller of weaponry to Europe —Germany put an arms embargo on Israel — but decided to buy missiles for 2 billion euros.So something is happening there that has become a bargaining chip or almost a foundation of how Israel understands it is going to maintain relationships without substantial change amid the Palestinians.This is very much a Trumpist, transactional world.Although I’m not a big fan of the idea of Israel being first the mistress of the Middle East and now the mistress of Europe.Can you say what that means?That is to say: We are not married to Saudi Arabia or the Emirates, but we meet at night when no one sees.The relationships are all clandestine.Exactly. Now here’s the dangerous idea behind it in Europe. I think Netanyahu failed to understand the depth of the international crisis Israel has gone through — because he knows more than you or I do about the real relationships. He knew how many European countries were begging for Israeli technology and weapons.But soft power is based on the idea that your brand is very strong. And for Israel, it was exactly the other way around: Israel almost turned into a pariah state even when the consumption for its technology and weapons increased.That’s why I think Israel should invest more in its branding.I think it’s more than branding.But that does open up the question: My read of Israel’s geopolitics right now is it is thriving where the relationships are transactional, and it is suffering where the relationships are more values based. And that’s beginning to include America.We just had a New York Times/Siena poll, which, for the first time since our polling has asked this question, going back to 1998, you had more Americans sympathizing with the Palestinians than the Israelis.Now the poll is very narrow. I think it was something like 35-34. But if you look at the age split in that poll, for Americans over 65 years old, about 47 percent are more sympathetic to the Israelis, compared to 26 percent more sympathetic to the Palestinians.But for Americans between 18 and 29, 61 percent are more sympathetic to the Palestinians and 19 percent to the Israelis.I think there’s a tendency to say it is just a leftist thing. But Megyn Kelly, the right-wing commentator, has told Tucker Carlson: “Everybody under 30 is against Israel.”Tell me how you’re understanding this. What’s going on in America? But also in Europe and other places, the numbers look even worse for Israel. How do you see this?To be honest, it’s too early to call. I don’t know if it’s something generational — something that’s going to change with time.In years past, if you left university — heavily funded by Qatar — you understand the situation more. That’s one thing.Second is the war. Today, the world is focused on suffering. The more you suffer, the more sympathy you get.Now remember after Oct. 7, when the Eiffel Tower, the Empire State Building and the Brandenburg Gate were lit blue and white?To be honest, the image that frightened me the most as an Israeli wasn’t the pictures from Sderot and the kibbutzim — it was seeing the Eiffel Tower lit up in blue and white. Because I thought: Wow — we must look so miserable that even in France we’re getting legitimacy.Now we won the war. We decisively won the war. I can explain for hours why abducting the Bibas family and murdering them with bare hands is not something you can compare to the death of Palestinian children from Israeli bombardments. However, I’m fully aware of the fact that images are so strong that I can’t convince millions and millions of TikTok followers.And that’s why I think the most dramatic thing for Israel is first and foremost to end the war and to move to a new phase of normalization and peace. Having Israel either mentioned positively in the press — or even better not mentioned at all.Netanyahu went on a few podcasts, and all of a sudden you could see that he didn’t control the media for the first time.He went on the Nelk Boys’ podcast — which I can only describe as a kind of “manosphere” podcast. Trump has been on many times. And they got so much backlash from their own listeners that they needed to apologize.One of them said he was told that having Netanyahu on is like having a modern-day Hitler on — and he went on to say he thought that was a good point.That’s coming from a right-wing coded space. That’s something different happening.I agree. I think there was permanent damage. I still think it’s smaller than people think.Now public opinion is elastic, especially when it comes to Israel and the Palestinians. It’s not abortions or weapons or, I don’t know, Trump. It’s something that you can change your mind on.People tend to forget that after the Yom Kippur War, Israel’s rating fell both in the United States and Europe following the oil embargo, etc. And Israel’s position in the States was very low following the first Lebanon war in 1982. The very same picture of a very long war in highly populated Palestinian areas. So I think it can change.But this is something more dramatic: We can no longer base our relationship with the United States on the values of the 20th century. Because even the evangelicals of the new generation don’t see Israel through the lens of a biblical happening — but rather through the lens of social justice. The African American community used to see the Jews as Moses coming from slavery in Egypt, but over the last few decades, it sees Israel as a white colonialist power.So there’s a lot to work on.Something bigger than that seems to have changed to me: It’s not just the polling — it’s what is considered conceivable in politics around Israel.Right now we’re in New York City, where Zohran Mamdani is very likely to become the next mayor. Even just a couple of years ago, his views on Israel would have made him absolutely unelectable almost anywhere in the country, but particularly in New York City, which is a very Jewish city.And it’s not just that he is most likely going to win the election — it is that what he is showing a lot of other Democrats is that they can express something closer to where their politics on Israel have actually gone.Andrew Cuomo tried very hard to weaponize Israel against him, and he completely failed. Eric Adams was running on the combat — or end — antisemitism ballot line. Completely failed —In the most Jewish city on Earth.Or at least: the city with the most Jews on Earth.That shifts things. And one reason I think it shifts things is that, while we often talk about this happening on the right, Netanyahu over the past 15 or 20 years threw in with the right and began to choose to polarize Israel and America by going around Barack Obama to the Republican Congress.Israel had a bit of an interregnum with Joe Biden, who was a much older generation of Democrat and personally had an older Democratic generation’s views on Israel. It’s one of the issues where Biden was to the right of how his own administration would have liked to approach the issue.Israel seems to be betting a lot on continued Republican dominance in America. If you imagine the next generation of Democrats being in power here and Israel needing American support in a time of conflict and crisis, it seems to me it’s going to look very different — both because of the views but also because I don’t think American Democrats believe anymore that they have to be more pro-Israel than they actually are.Two years ago, before the war, I met with the I.D.F. chief of staff at the time. He told me when you buy a jet fighter, you purchase it for its life expectancy — about 40 years. He said that when deciding which fighter jet to buy, you have to take into account that over the next 40 years — or about 10 terms — there is going to be a U.S. president who might put an arms embargo on Israel. That’s what he said in 2023.Now I think you and I would agree that had Kamala Harris gotten elected and Israel invaded Gaza City, we would have already seen it.I think we were on the cusp of that already happening. That’s a good point.Exactly. And again, it’s a chicken-and-egg question. I don’t think Netanyahu is to blame for the fact that Israel became a partisan issue. That’s because each and every topic in the U.S., including the weather, has become partisan.Well, he made choices. I watched this happen, particularly during the Obama administration.But tell me something: When Obama was first elected, I remember people saying that he doesn’t have sympathy for Israel in his kishke — in his gut.Obama was elected before Netanyahu returned to office. When Obama and Netanyahu met for the first time, Obama told him: Not even one brick in the West Bank. And he appeased the Iranian regime. So I fully agree — it takes two to tango.But Netanyahu made a series of strategic decisions because he did not want to take pressure — or at least he wanted to see whether Obama was really capable of applying pressure on him.Look, I’m an American Jew — I have more Israel in my kishke, so to speak. But I think Israel would have been better off if it had listened to Obama on settlements.Now, I recognize that you and I have a different view on this.Slightly.Even in the last two years, there’s been a rapidity of settlement construction in the West Bank that outpaces the last 20 years —More than ever.More than ever.So there is a world in which Israel made a strategic political decision to say something like: We want to make sure that the Democratic side of the aisle in the U.S. feels kinship here and feels we’re taking into account some of their concerns. And we’re going to hold ourselves back on certain things for that reason.Israel decided not to do that — and in many ways kind of spat in their face. Biden ended up humiliated.I think there were real decisions here on the Israeli side, particularly on Netanyahu’s side. And you could have imagined it playing out differently with different prime ministers.But the West Bank is easy. How about Iran? Do you see any scenario in which Obama and Biden —But if the West Bank is easy, why didn’t Israel do it?No, I mean it’s easy to speak about it. But the differences between Democratic administrations and Israel are not between Democratic administrations and Netanyahu. Because each and every Israeli saw Iran as the biggest threat to Jewish existence since the Holocaust.We know that Obama and Biden didn’t consider for a second to attack Fordo, for instance, or even to allow Israel to attack. My guess is Kamala Harris wouldn’t either.So it’s not only the easy Palestinian questions — it’s something much bigger than this. President Obama came into office, and he appeased enemies and (expletive) off friends.I think it is almost axiomatic that Democrats have a different view of what creates security than Republicans do.Prime Minister Netanyahu — I understand it’s addictive stuff to have to inhale the Trump administration, because you have the most pro-Israeli approach and his enemies are yours.I know it’s addictive. But maybe this problem can be fixed with a different prime minister and a different president.When I look forward into the future of this and try to put together the two parts of this conversation we’ve been having: You have Israel pursuing a lot of settlement building and control of the West Bank — there’s been a lot more violence — and you have the indefinite reoccupation of much of Gaza.Combine that then with these poll numbers and these changes in support in the U.S., and it’s not like Israel can just wait for the war to end. It is setting itself up in a structural position where the effort is going to — and possibly quite successfully — make it into apartheid South Africa. That is the strategy and also the risk it has opened up for itself by maintaining so much control in both places.How do you think about that?The main difference between Israel and South Africa is that the Black community in South Africa didn’t try to massacre each and every white person. That wasn’t the case there.Here we speak about South Africa, but let’s imagine that F.W. de Klerk had signed an agreement with Nelson Mandela — only to find out that Nelson Mandela, like Yasir Arafat, actually initiated a Second Intifada, a war against the whites, killing 1,200 of them and sending suicide bombers to Cape Town —I understand the argument that it’s a different situation. What I’m saying is that the international view is that you have roughly seven million Palestinians without any self-determination —No, they have a civil one. They got more than they have now, and they decided twice — both in the West Bank and in Gaza — that it’s more important for them to kill as many Jews as possible than to get more independence. That’s the thing that Westerners fail to understand.I keep asking myself why the security establishment failed on Oct. 6 to understand that this attack is imminent. I can speak to you for hours about SIM cards and alerts, etc. But at the end of the day, they failed to understand that there are people who have a lose-lose policy.We know win-win policy — this is good for all. We know win-lose policy like in Russia versus Ukraine, where Russia tries to take something. It’s evil, but it’s digestible.But we fail to understand a lose-lose situation — in which: I know I’m going to suffer. I know my people are going to die. I know Gaza is going to lie in ruins at the end of this war, yet I want to kill as many Jews and Israelis as possible.God knows I don’t want to speak for Hamas. But I think that another way of saying why the situation you described does not seem stable to me is that they felt — accurately — like they were losing.We talked about and you said: This is not a cycle of violence — it’s one side creating it.But I’ve had many Palestinians on the show. I’ve talked to many of them in our reporting. And to them, the violence is everyday: It is ongoing and ceaseless in Gaza and in the West Bank. They understand the condition they’re living in as a condition of structural violence. And I don’t disagree with them on that.The thing that is going to create the ongoing pressure: If you combine an international community that is less sympathetic to Israel — but Israel having much more control over these two places. I agree that it has many differences from the South African situation —You speak about the image.I’m speaking about both the image and the reality. The idea that forever you’ll just have a situation where you have around 7 million or so people —Five —I’m including Arabs in Israel, who have a different situation —They get full citizenship —People debate this in different ways. I don’t mean to go into it too much.But that seems like a situation in which Israel is going to have a lot of trouble in the long term with not just international standing, but eventually questions about sanctions and other things.I came to the conclusion following Oct. 7 that Israel’s No. 1 problem is the Palestinian one. I thought before that it’s the Iranian one. It is not.However, I can’t, in order to get legitimacy, give license to people who see me and treat me as an evil enemy who should be eliminated in each and every way. That’s the main thing.So I think we should wait patiently for a new generation to come. I think the most urgent mission of our generation — both in the U.S., Israel and the U.A.E. — is to base the education system in the Palestinian Authority not on hatred but rather on Western values, on moderate Islam.I know it can succeed. How? Because this is exactly what happened in the U.A.E. and in Saudi Arabia. And they changed the minds of Muslims in both countries. You see a decline in the levels of antisemitism.And since I’m not a racist, I don’t believe that Islam is about killing as many Jews as possible or hating as many Americans as possible or cheering and giving candy in the streets when disasters like the Sept. 11 disaster happened.It takes time — I would say 20 years. If we start today, 20 years from now, you’ll see a major change in both what you call the West Bank — Judea and Samaria — and in the Gaza Strip.I think the question that many people want to see change in Israel is whether or not Israel sees its politics collapsing in other countries.Let’s say that after President Trump, you have a Democrat win office, and there’s a recognition that Europe is now accepting Palestinian statehood in some abstracted way. And there’s sense that Israel can’t maintain support in the U.S. with the politics it has had.I could see that scenario going one of two ways. I could see that moving under certain leaders and certain conditions toward trying to create some space for the international opinion to express itself and a change in Israeli policy.I could see it in Israel’s becoming more inward-looking, more focused on weapons development and trying to be less reliant on others. There was an interesting quote I thought of from Netanyahu, where he said: Israel is going to have to adapt to international isolation — become an Athens and a super Sparta —In terms of acquiring weapons, yes.I’m sure people in Israel are thinking about this somewhat, given how aggressive the international anger has been.What are those two paths?I don’t see any chance that Israelis are going to change their mind regarding Palestinian statehood because it’s not about diplomacy, it’s not about public opinion — it’s about fear.People saw what happened on Oct. 7, and they will not be willing to give an opportunity for this five or 10 minutes at most from their home in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv. This is one thing.When it comes to cooperation, I think there is room for a party that would say: We are quite tired. We want to rest for a few years. We’ll be prepared. Our soldiers would guard everything, but we want to breathe some air — international air, economic air, etc.I think the next government would see a significant ingredient as I just described.There will be elections in Israel in October 2026 — or sometime before then if this government falls.Israeli politics isn’t structured the way U.S. politics are. Here, we’re used to thinking in terms of two parties that battle it out there. There, it’s two coalitions of different parties.Walk me through the anti-Netanyahu coalition that has developed. It looks like it would be led by Naftali Bennett, who traditionally, in Israeli politics was understood on Netanyahu’s right —In terms of security —In terms of security — certainly at an earlier point. He was harshly critical of how open Netanyahu at least claimed to be to a two-state solution — for instance.Exactly.You have Benny Gantz, who, in November 2023, was widely considered to be a plausible next prime minister for Israel. Now his Blue and White party is under the threshold for representation. Avigdor Lieberman, who’s quite a far-right-wing defense minister in 2018. Yair Lapid, who is one of the more centrist figures. Yair Golan, who represents the left in Israel, is inside this coalition, too.Eight percent of the popular vote — yes.How would that group govern? Where would they differ?It won’t. My 10-year-old child asked me: Why don’t you vote for the center left?I told him: Because they are leftists.And he asked: What is a leftist?I had a very hard time explaining this to him because 20 years ago it was for evacuating the settlement where your grandfather lives. Nowadays, no one really offers to evacuate settlements.So what is the watershed line in Israel these days?Is it center left? Naftali Bennett is the center left?Exactly. Now here’s the thing: Who is this awful, monstrous left that is going to try to defeat Netanyahu — according to the right-wing?It’s Naftali Bennett — the former C.E.O. of the Yesha Council, the settlement movement.Avigdor Lieberman is a settler himself who once said that Israel should hang each and every one of the Arab Knesset members, like in Nuremberg.Benny Gantz — calling him a leftist is not —I don’t think any leftist would claim him.Exactly and vice versa.So it’s about identity. First and foremost, what I believe is that the more religious you are, the more you tend to vote for the right-wing.The debate over the judicial reform was not about the judicial reform but about whether Israel is more Jewish than democratic or more democratic than Jewish.And the right wing here is the Netanyahu coalition.Exactly. Now it’s quite a miracle that the leader of this so-called religious Jewish, Sephardic, relatively lower-class camp in Israel is, in fact, a secular atheist millionaire and the son of a professor from Jerusalem —We’re acquainted with these peculiarities in American politics at this point. (Laughs.)It’s not peculiar because the politics of identities is not something that I believe in. I think it’s a woke way of describing things and that people don’t vote for someone like them. If you have a bird, you’ll vote for someone with a bird. It’s ridiculous. You vote for someone who you believe would represent your values the most.So this is the watershed line. And that’s why, in my opinion, the ultra-Orthodox parties are not part of the right wing at all — they are anti-settlement and anti-annexation — and yet a basic part of Netanyahu’s coalition. Because it’s about Judaism.But I would like to offer something else. We moved in 2020 from one generation — the security generation — toward the identity generation. And that’s exactly the point at which Israel went through five consecutive election campaigns. Why? It’s like the summer league in the N.B.A., where you are still trying to get accustomed to your new basketball team, but it takes time. Because you used to be for the Chicago Bulls, and now you are for the New York Knicks.What was the dividing identity line? Is it just a religious identity?The religious one. I’ll give you an example: Avigdor Lieberman. In terms of security, he’s the most hawkish figure in Israel. His voters are former U.S.S.R. immigrants who are more hawkish than Ben-Gvir. But when you talk about domestic and civil society issues, he is more secular than Yair Golan and Yair Lapid. That’s why Avigdor Lieberman moved from the so-called right-wing to the so-called left. Although he is not a leftist. Because it’s not the left we used to know.The same applies for Naftali Bennett. In terms of security, yes, he is allegedly more hawkish than Netanyahu. But when it comes to civil society and domestic issues, he is the leader of the moderate, small-yarmulke voters who believe in, for instance, public transportation during Saturdays for Shabbat.“Small-yarmulke voters” is a good line.This is the main change. Let’s speak about the last coalition to defeat Netanyahu in 2021. It was called Change. But when you try to really analyze where the change is, you couldn’t find a change in the policy toward Gaza, the policy toward Iran or the policy toward settlements — all of which was the same. Even in terms of economy, it wasn’t a social justice coalition but even more hawkish, more capitalist, than Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition.The main change was changing the address of Sara Netanyahu — Prime Minister Netanyahu’s wife.So there was no change. And that’s why you see Israel’s political system has reshaped itself. If you are American, hoping for change in terms of policy, you’ll get quite disappointed.Change toward the Palestinians.Toward the Palestinians, toward Gaza.I would say even more than this — that a coalition controlled by Bennett, Lieberman, Golan, etc., would never be able to sign this Trump cease-fire plan because the right-wingers would kill them.Netanyahu would say: This is a surrender to Hamas.Do you think there’s a good shot that Netanyahu just survives the next election?Yes. But I have to explain something about Israeli politics. In the U.S., when you have Trump versus Harris, one of them must win because someone has to get 270 votes in the electoral college.In Israel, you can either win or lose or have an undecided election. Why? Because in Israel you have other parties that traditionally do not take part in coalitions. There was one exception four years ago, but it was under the Covid crisis — which was a domestic issue.As long as Israel has its complicated strategic relationship with the Muslim world, I don’t see any coalition formed on the basis of an Arab, non-Zionist or sometimes anti-Zionist party.So if you get 61 seats, you’ve won the election. Bibi won the election 61 out of 120 — outright majority. But if you get 50, you didn’t win the election — but you didn’t lose it, either, because you blocked the center left — the change bloc — from forming a coalition.According to polls following the deal reaching Gaza, Netanyahu got 51 — at least. Netanyahu lost the outright majority. But as a result of the cease-fire and Iran and Hezbollah being defeated, Netanyahu secured himself from not losing the election — for the time being.Time and again, he has outnumbered his opponents. It’s too early to call, but I would say that something dramatic would have to happen in order for Netanyahu to directly lose the next election.Do you think his government will stand until October 2026?No, but the last coalition to survive a full term in Israel was in 1988.I know it sounds weird for Americans, but in Israel there are no fixed terms. Netanyahu succeeded in the mission that most of the governments failed to reach the fourth year — the final year of his term. And it’s amazing. No one believed it, including Netanyahu himself, the day after Oct. 7.Always our final question: What are three books you’d recommend to the audience?I recommend two books in English and one in Hebrew.The first is “The Accidental President” by A.J. Baime, which is about President Truman’s first four months. Great book.The second is not exactly a book about presidents, but a book about the history of how to write the history of presidents: “An Unfinished Love Story” by Doris Kearns Goodwin. She was married to President Johnson’s and President Kennedy’s special adviser. And it’s a brilliant book about how to write about history.The third is a book in Hebrew. It was written by my father, Hagai Segal. It’s called “Messiah in Sde Boker.” It’s about David Ben-Gurion, the founding father of Israel, who was a mixture of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson. He was considered a very secular leftist leader at the time. But my father reveals how, deep inside, he was very Jewish, and how the right wing should fall in love with him in retrospect. If you want to understand Israel, it’s better for you to study Hebrew, to learn Hebrew as fast as possible and to read it.Amit Segal, thank you very much.Thank you so much.You can listen to this conversation by following “The Ezra Klein Show” on the NYT App, Apple, Spotify, Amazon Music, YouTube, iHeartRadio or wherever you get your podcasts. View a list of book recommendations from our guests here.This episode of “The Ezra Klein Show” was produced by Jack McCordick. Fact-checking by Michelle Harris, Kate Sinclair and Mary Marge Locker. Our senior engineer is Jeff Geld, with additional mixing by Isaac Jones. Our executive producer is Claire Gordon. The show’s production team also includes Marie Cascione, Annie Galvin, Rollin Hu, Kristin Lin, Emma Kehlbeck, Marina King and Jan Kobal. Original music by Pat McCusker and Aman Sahota. Audience strategy by Kristina Samulewski and Shannon Busta. The director of New York Times Opinion Audio is Annie-Rose Strasser. Transcript editing by Naomi Noury.The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.Follow the New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Bluesky, WhatsApp and Threads.
已发布: 2025-10-28 09:04:00
来源: www.nytimes.com
